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DANIEL GILPIN†
INTRODUCTION
Whistleblowing is a high-stakes business.
Although a
whistleblower may receive huge rewards for uncovering a
securities law violation,1 he or she may also live in fear of facing
retaliation by his or her employer.2 In 2014, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) paid out more awards to
whistleblowers than in all previous years combined.3
In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) “[t]o
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system.”4 To
improve accountability and transparency, Congress created a
bounty program to incentivize whistleblowers with awards for

†
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Providence College.
1
Christina Rexrode & Timothy W. Martin, Whistleblowers Score a Big Payday:
Three Individuals, One Firm To Receive $170 Million in Bank of America Probe,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/third-whistleblower-tocollect-reward-related-to-bank-of-america-settlement-1419014474.
2
See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721,
754 (2014) (stating that whistleblowers may fear poor performance reviews,
disqualifications from bonuses, thwarted career development, termination, difficulty
in obtaining new employment without employer recommendations, social ostracism,
office harassment, and even threats).
3
SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 10 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annualreport-2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 ANNUAL REPORT].
4
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12,
and 15 U.S.C.).
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helpful tips given to the SEC.5 However, it is currently unclear
who qualifies as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower.6 Courts are split
on whether an individual must report violations to the SEC or if
it is sufficient to report to internal management to qualify as a
whistleblower.7 This threshold question is of utmost importance
because only whistleblowers qualify for protection under DoddFrank’s antiretaliation provision.8
In September 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit created a split of authority with the Fifth
Circuit on the statutory definition of a Dodd-Frank
whistleblower.9 In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC,10 the Second
Circuit determined that the definition provision and
antiretaliation provision conflicted with one another, finding that
the statute was ambiguous.11 In light of this ambiguity, the
Second Circuit deferred to the SEC’s interpretation of the statute
and held that an individual qualifies as a whistleblower, and is
therefore protected under the antiretaliation provision, whether
he or she reports to the SEC or reports internally.12 On the other
hand, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy,13 the Fifth Circuit followed the
narrow statutory definition of whistleblower found in the text of
Dodd-Frank and held that an employee must report to the SEC
in order to qualify as a whistleblower and thus, to qualify for
antiretaliation protection.14
This Note argues that a plain reading of the statute—as
championed by the Fifth Circuit—is correct in that an individual
qualifies as a whistleblower only when she reports a violation to
the SEC. Part I provides a history and background of modern
antiretaliation whistleblower legislation. Part I also discusses
the circumstances surrounding the passage of Dodd-Frank, the
5

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2012).
Compare Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir.
2013), with Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015).
7
Compare Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629 (holding that only those individuals who
report to the SEC qualify as whistleblowers), with Berman, 801 F.3d at 155 (holding
that those individuals who report internally, as well as those who report to the SEC,
qualify as whistleblowers).
8
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
9
Compare Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629, with Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
10
801 F.3d 145.
11
Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
12
Id.
13
720 F.3d 620.
14
Id. at 629.
6
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text of the whistleblower provisions, and the relevant SEC
regulations. Part II outlines the recent case law on the issue of
who qualifies as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower. Part III argues
that only individuals who report to the SEC qualify as DoddFrank whistleblowers and addresses criticism of that reasoning.
I.

A HISTORY OF MODERN ANTIRETALIATION WHISTLEBLOWER
LEGISLATION

A.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) in
the wake of the Enron scandal.15 In October 2001, Enron shocked
the financial world when it announced a $618 million loss for the
third quarter, which led to a $1.2 billion drop in shareholder
value.16 Federal investigations—and eventually indictments—
followed.17 Sherron Watkins, a vice president at Enron, came
forward and testified before Congress regarding the complex
accounting scheme used by Enron to inflate its public value.18
Watkins had reported the accounting scheme anonymously to
both the CFO and the chairman of the board of directors.19 She
hoped her reports would result in reform, but Enron immediately
sought legal advice about whether Watkins could be terminated
without repercussions.20 Watkins was eventually relegated from
her executive suite to a meager office and given menial tasks.21

15

S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002).
Id.; see also Josh Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Posts Surprise 3rdQuarter Loss After Investment, Asset Write-Downs, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2001),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003237924744857040.
17
See generally Indictment, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, Cr. No.
CRH–02–121, 2002 WL 33949318 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002); Indictment, United
States v. Fastow, Cr. No. CRH-02-0665, 2003 WL 22331357 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30,
2003).
18
See generally The Financial Collapse of Enron—Part 3: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. 15–16 (2003) (statement of Sherron Watkins, Vice President
of Corporate Development, Enron Corp.).
19
Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 360–61 (2003).
20
Id. at 362–63.
21
Id. at 363.
16
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Senators reacted with fury when they learned that Enron
sought to fire Watkins for disclosing her findings instead of
correcting the accounting fraud.22 As a result, Congress included
whistleblower protections in SOX in an effort to make potential
whistleblowers comfortable with reporting potential violations.23
SOX protects whistleblowers by outlawing retaliation by
publicly traded companies against employees who provide
information about securities law violations.24 Employees are
protected in providing information to (1) a federal regulatory or
law enforcement agency; (2) Congress; or (3) a supervisor with
authority to investigate.25
An aggrieved employee has an
enforcement procedure if he or she has been a victim of employer
retaliation.26 First, the employee must file an administrative
complaint with the Secretary of Labor.27 Second, and only if that
administrative complaint does not result in a final decision
within 180 days, the employee has a private cause of action
before a federal district court for wrongful retaliation.28 This
administrative filing requirement is a type of administrative
The administrative exhaustion
exhaustion requirement.29
requirement
presents
difficult
procedural
hurdles
to
30
whistleblowers.
A successful SOX whistleblower’s relief is
reinstatement with the same seniority status, back pay with
interest, special damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees.31
The statute of limitations for a SOX cause of action is 180 days
after the violation occurs or 180 days after the employee became
aware of the violation.32

22
S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002). Other potential whistleblowers came
forward, claiming that they were silenced when they questioned Enron’s stock
valuations or financial practices. See, e.g., Man Says Advice To Sell Enron Led to
Firing, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/05/business/
man-says-advice-to-sell-enron-led-to-firing.html.
23
S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002); see generally 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
24
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
25
Id.
26
See id. § 1514A(b).
27
Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(A).
28
Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).
29
See, e.g., Wong v. CKX, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
30
Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 100–01
(2007).
31
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c).
32
Id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
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B.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010

1.

Legislation in Reponse to the Financial Crisis

855

Congress’s most recent antiretaliation whistleblower
legislation was a part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”). Dodd-Frank
was passed in the wake of the financial collapse in the late
2000s.33 In 2008, Lehman Brothers, a financial titan, filed for
bankruptcy in the wake of nationwide escalating foreclosures.34
As a result, institutions stopped issuing commercial paper35 and
the financial world came to a screeching halt.36 The financial
crisis deepened, affecting all consumer borrowers.37 Commentary
after the financial crisis generally called for more stringent
government regulation.38
2.

The Whistleblower Provisions

This Note focuses on the whistleblower provisions of DoddFrank, particularly the definition and antiretaliation sections
located in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (the “Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Provisions”). In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, Congress
33
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
34
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html.
35
Commercial paper is a source of short-term financing, usually with
repayment due one day to ninety days later. It is used by banking institutions to
finance their daily operations when they loan more than they have on hand. See
Shah Gilani, Credit Crisis Update: An Inside Look at the Commercial Paper Debacle,
MONEY MORNING (Oct. 9, 2008), http://moneymorning.com/2008/10/09/credit-crisisupdate.
36
Id. (“[T]he immediate problem is the commercial paper market. It’s
dead. . . . [It is an] inevitable contagion spreading like nuclear winter across the
globe.”)
37
See Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Past Subprime
Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/business/
12credit.html (discussing how prime borrowers, in addition to subprime borrowers,
became unable to get any credit because the financial industry’s knee-jerk reaction
to tighten lending standards); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9 (2010) (“[M]illions of
Americans have lost jobs; millions of American families have lost trillions of dollars
in net worth; millions of Americans have lost their homes; and millions of Americans
have lost their retirement, college, and other savings.”).
38
See Gary S. Becker, The Great Recession and Government Failure, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904199404576536
930606933332.
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passed Dodd-Frank “[t]o promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system.”39
Among other things, Dodd-Frank
established a whistleblower reward program40 and provides
whistleblowers with a cause of action for wrongful retaliation by
an employer.41
Under Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower is defined as “any
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of
the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established,
by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”42 The second part of
the statute at issue is the antiretaliation provision under
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). Specifically, an employer may not:
[D]ischarge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment
because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance
with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation
or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based
upon or related to such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this
chapter, including [§] 78j-1(m) of this title, [§] 1513(e) of Title
18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.43

For the sake of brevity, this Note refers to each of the respective
subsections of the antiretaliation provision as subsection (i),
subsection (ii), and subsection (iii).
Courts have had to interpret whether, under subsection (iii),
individuals who report internally to management qualify as
Dodd-Frank whistleblowers. A plain reading of the statute
seems to indicate they do not because the statutory definition is
incorporated in the antiretaliation provision; a person who

39

Pub. L. No. 111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat 1376, 1376 (2010).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012) (entitling a whistleblower to anywhere between
ten percent and thirty percent of sanctions that are imposed in the action).
41
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (“An individual who alleges discharge or other
discrimination in violation of subparagraph (A) may bring an action under this
subsection in the appropriate district court of the United States . . . .”).
42
Id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
43
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
40
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reports to the SEC is protected from retaliation for making three
different types of disclosures under the statute.44 The Fifth
Circuit and some district courts have ruled that this plain
reading of the statute is correct.45 However, several district
courts, and most recently the Second Circuit, either read the
statute in a contorted fashion to find ambiguity or read
subsection (iii) as an implied exception to the definition of a
whistleblower.46
Unfortunately, because Congress passed Dodd-Frank in
quick fashion, there is little legislative history from which to
discern if Congress intended anything other than the plain
meaning of the statute to control.47 However, what little exists is
very telling. In its report, the House of Representatives was
pleased that Dodd-Frank “enhances incentives and protections
for whistleblower providing information leading to successful
SEC enforcement actions.”48 The Senate, in its report, was
impressed that the new whistleblower program was “designed to
motivate people who know of securities violations to tell the
SEC.”49

44
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.2d 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2015) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting) (stating “[this] is the more natural reading of the statute.”)
45
See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013);
Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644 (E.D. Wis. 2014);
Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v. Bank of
Am. Corp., Civil Action No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at*5 (D. Colo. July
19, 2013), aff’d on different grounds, 571 F. App’x. 698 (10th Cir. 2014).
46
See e.g. Berman, 801 F.3d at 155 (“[A]t a minimum, the tension between the
definition . . . subsection . . . and the limited protection provided by [subsection]
(iii) . . . if it is subject to that definition section renders [the Whistleblower
Provisions] sufficiently ambiguous.”); see also Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1088, 1104–05 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (leave granted to appeal to the 9th Cir.);
Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147–48
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013);
Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106–07 (D. Colo. 2013);
Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *5 (D.
Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL
1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
47
Only one House report and one Senate report speak to the whistleblower
issue.
48
H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 727 (2010) (Conf. Rep.). It would be bizarre for
Congress to think that internal disclosures would lead to “successful SEC
enforcement actions.”
49
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
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In Dodd-Frank, relief for a successful plaintiff is defined as
(1) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the
individual would have had, but for the discrimination; (2) two
times back pay with interest; and (3) litigation costs and
reasonable attorney fees.50 The statute of limitation for a DoddFrank cause of action is between six to ten years, depending on
when the whistleblower learned of the violation.51
There are three important differences between the SOX
antiretaliation cause of action and the Dodd-Frank
antiretaliation cause of action. First, the Dodd-Frank cause of
action provides greater monetary damages than the SOX cause of
action because Dodd-Frank allows for double back pay, whereas
SOX only allows for actual back pay.52 Second, the Dodd-Frank
cause of action does not have an administrative exhaustion
requirement, whereas the SOX cause of action does.53 Third, the
Dodd-Frank cause of action has a statute of limitations that is at
least ten times as long as the statute of limitations for the SOX
cause of action.54 As a result, plaintiffs usually prefer to proceed
under a Dodd-Frank cause of action.
3.

SEC Regulations

The SEC promulgated rules and regulations regarding the
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress.55 In November 2010, the SEC issued its
proposed rule, Regulation 21F, and sought comments from the
public.56 The proposed rule prompted vigorous discussion; the
SEC received more than 240 comment letters and 1,300 form
50

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2012).
The statute of limitation is (1) six years from the date of the violation, or
(2) three years after the date when a Plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
discovered facts that indicate she has a cause of action—to a maximum of ten years
after the date of the violation. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii).
52
Compare id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B).
53
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514(b)(1).
54
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (providing for a statute of limitations
between six to ten years after the violation), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D)
(providing for a statue of limitations of 180 days after the violation occurs or 180
days after the employee becomes aware of the violation).
55
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2012) (“The [SEC] shall have the authority to issue
such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the
provisions of this section consistent with the purposes of this section.”).
56
See generally Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488-01 (proposed Nov. 17, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249).
51

FINAL_GILPIN

2016]

2/14/2017 11:03 PM

HIDING BEHIND THE VEIL OF AMBIGUITY

859

letters.57 Many comments from large corporations and corporate
interest groups suggested amendments that required
whistleblowers to report internally before reporting to the SEC,58
similar to the SOX requirement of internal reporting before
external reporting.59 Some commenters strongly disagreed with
those suggested amendments.60 One commenter stated, “DoddFrank was a knowing Congressional repudiation of the SarbanesOxley school of preventative corporate compliance.”61
In the first part of its two part final rule, the SEC defines a
whistleblower “as an individual who . . . provides information to
the [SEC] relating to a potential violation of the securities
The second part of the final rule discusses the
laws.”62
antiretaliation provision, and indicates that it creates “three
different categories of whistleblowers, and the third category
includes individuals who report to persons or governmental
authorities other than the [SEC].”63 The SEC reasoned that this
is a reasonable interpretation because it supports a core objective
of the SEC’s whistleblower rulemaking—to avoid disincentivizing
individuals
from
reporting
internally
in
appropriate
57

Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300,
34300 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249). A list of the
submitted comments is available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3310/s73310.shtml.
58
See Comment Letter on Proposed Whistleblower Rules from Steven Fagell,
Esq., Covington and Burling, LLP, to Sarit Klein & Stephen L. Cohen (Feb. 18,
2011) (on file with the SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-273.pdf;
Comment Letter on Proposed Whistleblower Rules from David Baris, Exec. Dir.,
American Ass’n of Bank Dirs., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n
(Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Ass’n of Bank Dirs. Comment Letter] (on file with the
SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-213.pdf; Hearing on Legis.
Proposals To Address the Negative Consequences of the Dodd Frank Whistleblower
Provisions Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 112th
Cong. (2011) (statement of Ken Daly, President and CEO, NACD), https://www.
sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-312.pdf.
59
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1) (2012); see also discussion supra Section I.A.
60
See Comment Letter on Proposed Whistleblower Rules from Kurt S. Schulzke,
Esq, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Schulzke] (on file
with the SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-201.pdf; Hearing on
Legis. Proposals To Address the Negative Consequences of the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored
Enters., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Professor of
Law, Univ. of Toledo Coll. of Law).
61
Schulzke, supra note 60.
62
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300,
34301 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 CFR pt. 240).
63
Id. at 34304.
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circumstances.64 The SEC sought to avoid creating a two-tiered
system of antiretaliation provisions favoring those who report to
the SEC, which the SEC stated would disincentivize internal
reporting.65
The SEC was also concerned with reports made to law
enforcement agencies, because those reports would not qualify
under a narrow reading of “to the Commission” under the
whistleblower definition.66 In its amicus brief to the Second
Circuit, the SEC provided a hypothetical to illustrate the
consequences of reading the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Provisions narrowly.
The hypothetical stated that if an
individual reported securities fraud to the FBI and the employer
terminated the individual before any report was made to the
SEC, then the individual would not qualify as a whistleblower
and therefore, would not be protected under the antiretaliation
provision.67 In that situation, the terminated individual would
only have recourse under SOX.68
Currently, there is a split of authority among the circuit
courts on whether this SEC regulation is an unreasonable
interpretation of a clear Congressional mandate or a reasonable
clarification of an ambiguous statute.69
II. RECENT CASE LAW
A.

Court of Appeals Rulings

1.

Asadi

In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,70 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the text of the
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions was unambiguous and
only those individuals who report violations to the SEC qualify as

64
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 29, Berman v.
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) (No.14-4626), 2015 WL 636112
[hereinafter SEC 2d Cir. Amicus Brief].
65
Id. at 29.
66
Id. at 34.
67
Id. at 34–35.
68
Id.
69
Compare Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir.
2013), with Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015).
70
720 F.3d 620.
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Dodd-Frank whistleblowers.71 In Asadi, Plaintiff was defendantemployer’s Iraq Country Executive.72 Iraqi officials informed
Plaintiff that Defendant hired a woman closely associated with a
senior Iraqi official in order to curry favor with that official in
negotiating a lucrative agreement.73 Plaintiff reported this issue
to his supervisor, fearing that this was a violation of the Foreign
Plaintiff was given a
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).74
“surprisingly negative review” after that internal report and was
fired one year later.75
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging a violation of the DoddFrank antiretaliation provision because he was terminated for
his internal reports to management regarding possible FCPA
violations.76 Defendant moved to dismiss on the premise that
Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief, arguing that since
Plaintiff did not report a violation to the SEC, Plaintiff did not
qualify as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower.77 The district court
dismissed the complaint on other grounds.78 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit “start[ed] and end[ed] [its] analysis with the text of the
relevant statute—15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.”79 The court first examined
the structure of the section, noting that subsection (a) provided a
list of definitions, including the term whistleblower and that
subsection (h) defined what actions could not be taken against
defined whistleblowers.80
The court determined that the statutory definition of
whistleblower and the antiretaliation provision do not conflict for
two reasons.81 First, the court reasoned that the antiretaliation
provision uses the term “whistleblower” rather than “employee”
or “individual,” which are used in other sections. This suggests
that Congress intended the prohibited activity section to only
apply to whistleblowers as statutorily defined.82 Second, the
court addressed a critique of this reasoning—that it renders
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 629.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 626–27.
Id.
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subsection (iii) superfluous—by reading subsection (iii) as
antiretaliation protection for other required disclosures other
than reporting to the SEC.83 This would arise when an employee
reports a securities law violation to its employer and
simultaneously reports to the SEC without informing its
employer.84 If the employer terminates the employee for the
internal report, subsection (iii) prevents the employer from
arguing that, because it did not know about the SEC report, the
employee is not entitled to antiretaliation protection, despite
being a statutorily defined whistleblower.85 The court reasoned
that its narrow reading does not render subsection (iii)
superfluous because this simultaneous reporting example is a
conceivable one.86
The court also reasoned that allowing those who report
internally to qualify as whistleblowers would render the SOX
antiretaliation provision moot.87 If internal reporting qualified
one to be a Dodd-Frank whistleblower, every plaintiff would file
her claim as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower and not a SOX
whistleblower.
This is because Dodd-Frank whistleblowers
receive double the back pay88 and have no administrative
exhaustion requirement.89 Plaintiff’s final argument was that
the court should give Chevron deference to the SEC’s regulations
because the SEC is the agency charged with enforcing the DoddFrank Act.90 The court rejected that argument because Chevron
deference is only given to an agency where the statute is
ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is a reasonable one.91
Here, the court explained that the statute is unambiguous and

83
Id. at 627. For example, attorneys are required to report internally evidence
of a material violation of securities law to the chief legal counsel or chief executive
officer. 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2012).
84
Asadi, 720 F.3d. at 627–28.
85
Id. at 628.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)
(2012).
89
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1).
90
Asadi, 720 F.3d. at 629.
91
Id. at 629–30.
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the SEC’s interpretation unreasonably expands the definition of
whistleblower beyond a plain reading of the statute.92
Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal.93
2.

Berman

In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC,94 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the text of the DoddFrank Whistleblower Provisions was ambiguous and therefore,
gave deference to the SEC’s interpretation of the definition of a
whistleblower, which includes those who report a violation to the
SEC and those who report a violation internally.95 Defendant
was a media agency, owned by a parent company, which provided
digital and direct media services.96 Plaintiff was defendantemployer’s finance director.97 Plaintiff was responsible for the
company’s financial reporting, compliance with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), and the internal
accounting procedures of Defendant and its parent company.98
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he discovered fraudulent
accounting procedures that violated GAAP, SOX, and DoddFrank.99 Plaintiff reported these potential violations internally
to a senior officer and defendant’s Audit Committee.100 The
senior officer was upset with Plaintiff and fired him for his
internal report of the potential violations.101
When Plaintiff filed suit, Defendant moved to dismiss,
arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief because he
did not qualify as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower, as he did not
report a violation to the SEC.102 The district court agreed and
dismissed the case.103 On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that
the question presented was whether reading the two sections of

92

Id.
Id. at 630.
94
801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
95
Id. at 155.
96
Id. at 149.
97
Id. at 148.
98
Id. at 148–49.
99
Id. at 149.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
93
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the Dodd-Frank Whistleblowers Provisions together made the
text sufficiently unclear to warrant Chevron deference to the
SEC’s interpretation.104
The court determined that reading the statutory definition of
whistleblower and subsection (iii) together drastically limited the
scope of subsection (iii) to cover only people who report a
violation internally and to the SEC simultaneously.105 Reading
the statutory definition of whistleblower in conjunction with
subsection (iii) is especially problematic because under federal
law, some whistleblowers, like auditors and attorneys,106 are
required to report violations internally before reporting to the
SEC.107 The court recognized that subsection (iii) was added at
the last minute.108 In light of that, the court was “doubtful that
the conferees who accepted the last-minute insertion of
sub[section] (iii) would have expected it to have the extremely
limited scope it would have if it were restricted by the [SEC]
reporting requirement in the ‘whistleblower’ definition in
subsection 21F(a)(6).”109 After discussing that in dicta,110 the
court determined that the tension between the definition section
and the antiretaliation provision makes the statute ambiguous
and determined the SEC’s interpretation was reasonable under
Chevron.111 The case was remanded for further proceedings.112
The dissent criticized the majority’s reasoning as an attempt
to rewrite the statute in order to close a perceived gap in
protection for whistleblowers.113 The dissent noted that the

104
Id. at 150. The court stated that King v. Burwell was the controlling
precedent for an analysis of a possibly ambiguous statute and that the court was not
conducting a review under the absurdity doctrine. Id.
105
Id. at 150–51.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 151.
108
Id. at 152–53.
109
Id. at 155.
110
Id.. (“If we had to choose between reading the statute literally or broadly to
carry out its apparent purpose, we might well favor the latter course. However, we
need not definitively construe the statute, because, at a minimum, the tension
between the definition in subsection 21F(a)(6) and the limited protection provided by
sub[section] (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) if it is subject to that definition renders
section 21F as a whole sufficiently ambiguous to oblige us to give Chevron deference
to the reasonable interpretation of the agency charged with administering the
statute.”).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 155 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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majority misquoted the statute by substituting the term
“employee” for the term “whistleblower” in the antiretaliation
provision.114
Because the term whistleblower is expressly
defined, the majority should have looked to the definition section,
but instead “look[ed] here, there and everywhere—except to the
statutory text.”115 The majority’s finding of ambiguity was
improper because the plain reading of the statute only leaves
subsection (iii) “extremely limited [in] scope.”116 As the dissent
pointed out, “[t]he U.S. Code is full of statutory provisions with
‘extremely limited’ effect,” and that alone does not make a statute
ambiguous.117 The dissent concluded that the majority should
not have “cast aside plain statutory text just because they harbor
‘doubt[s]’ about what was going on in the heads of individual
‘conferees’ during the legislative process.”118
B.

District Court Rulings

Many district courts have interpreted the language and
structure of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions. These
opinions are best understood in three categories: (1) reading as
unambiguous; (2) reading as ambiguous; and (3) reading
subsection (iii) as an implied exception to the definition of
whistleblower. The second and third categories of reading
occasionally overlap.119

114

Id. at 157.
Id. at 158.
116
Id.
117
Id. The dissent also noted that the majority wisely did not discuss the
absurdity doctrine, in recognition that the result of a plain reading does not create
an absurd result, merely a narrow one. Id. at n.1. (citing Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (holding that “[i]f a literal construction of
the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the
absurdity.”)). The dissent went on to distinguish from King v. Burwell, which the
majority relied upon. Id. at 159. In King, the Supreme Court determined that one
subsection’s plain meaning, which prevented establishing health care exchanges,
cannot stand in an act that was designed to establish health care exchanges. See
Berman, 801 F.3d at 159 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015)). The
dissent pointed out that here “the sole consequence of applying the statute as
written is that those who report securities violations only to their employer will
receive statutory protection that in the SEC's view is sub-optimal.” Id.
118
Id. at 160 (alteration in original) (citing majority opinion at 155).
119
See e.g., Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL
2190084, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
115
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Reading as Unambiguous

Three district courts (“the Unambiguous Courts”) have
followed the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and found the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions unambiguous.120 “Each district court
determined that the definition section defines whistleblower and
that the anti-retaliation provision lists what protected actions
whistleblowers can take.”121 One court noted, “Congress could
have used a word other than ‘whistleblower’ [in the
antiretaliation provision] but chose not to.”122 Another court
remarked that there is nothing ambiguous about the fact that
“one may engage in protected activity and yet not qualify as a
whistleblower” under the statute.123 That court stated that any
argument against such understanding is an argument based
solely on a disagreement about public policy, and not statutory
interpretation.124 The Unambiguous Courts disagreed with the
courts that read the statute as ambiguous (the “Ambiguous
Courts”) in their application of the surplusage doctrine to the
Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower
Provisions.
Further,
the
Unambiguous Courts stated that, although their interpretation
may render the term “to the Commission” superfluous in the
antiretaliation provision, the Ambiguous Courts’ interpretation
renders the entire statutory whistleblower definition
superfluous.125

120
See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644 (E.D. Wis.
2014); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v.
Bank of Am. Corp., Civil Action No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *5 (D.
Colo. July 19, 2013), aff’d on different grounds, 571 F. App’x. 698 (10th Cir. 2014).
121
See Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645; Wagner, 2013 WL 3786643, at *6 (citing
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013)); Banko, 20 F.
Supp. 3d at 756.
122
Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 756 (citing Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626).
123
Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 644. The Verfuerth court made this point again,
stating “[c]reating a class of people (whistleblowers) and then protecting them from
various discriminatory acts in addition to the act that qualified them for that class
does not produce ambiguity or conflict.” Id. at 645.
124
See id. at 644.
125
Id. at 644–45.
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Reading as Ambiguous

The Ambiguous Courts analyzed the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions under the Chevron doctrine and ruled
that the statute is ambiguous.126 Under Chevron, a court must
conduct a two-part analysis to determine whether an agency’s
interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference.127 First, the
court must determine if Congress has spoken precisely to the
question at issue.128 If Congress has not, then the statute is
ambiguous.129 Second, if the statute is ambiguous, the court
must decide whether the responsible executive agency’s
interpretation of the statute is a reasonable one.130 If reasonable,
then the agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference.131
The majority of district courts confronted with this statutory
interpretation question have ruled that the text of the DoddFrank Whistleblower Provisions is ambiguous under the first
step of the Chevron analysis.132 One cited reason is to avoid
These courts determined that applying the
surplusage.133
statutory definition of whistleblower would render subsection (iii)
superfluous or would render the two sections in conflict with one
another.134 Some courts have also found that enforcing the plain

126

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984) (holding that a court should defer to a responsible executive agency's
permissible construction of a statute where the statutory language is ambiguous or
otherwise does not speak precisely to the question at issue).
127
See id.
128
See id. at 842–43.
129
See id. at 843.
130
See id.
131
See id. at 843–44.
132
See, e.g., Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1104–05 (N.D.
Cal. 2015); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147–
48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass.
2013); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo.
2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *4
(D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011
WL 1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
133
Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1102.
134
See id. at 1100; Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 534
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147–48; Murray, 2013 WL 2190084,
at *4; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5.
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definition of whistleblower would render the words “to the
Commission” in subsection (i) superfluous135 and have considered
legislative history and public policy as controlling factors.136
Under the second step of the Chevron test, courts presume
that a responsible agency’s interpretation of a term is
reasonable.137 Every court that has reached this step of the
Chevron analysis has ruled that the SEC’s interpretation of the
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions is a reasonable one and, as
a result, entitled to deference.138 The primary reason is that the
SEC’s interpretation settles the ambiguity that courts have found
between the definition section and the antiretaliation
provision.139
3.

Reading Subsection (iii) as an Implied Exception to the
Whistleblower Definition

The third interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Provisions is that subsection (iii) provides an implied exception to
the definition of a whistleblower.140 Under this reading, a person
is a whistleblower if she discloses information to the SEC or
meets one of the three categories of disclosure under subsection
(iii).141 District courts that have employed this interpretation
reason that this interpretation preserves the statutory text while
giving effect to SEC Rule 21F.142
135

Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1102; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5.
Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1103 (reasoning that because subsection (iii) was
added at the last minute, it is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend for
this subsection to be limited to only those whistleblowers who report to the SEC);
Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4 (reasoning that it is not “unambiguously clear that
the Dodd-Frank Act’s retaliation provision only applies to those individuals who
have provided information relating to a securities violation to the [SEC] . . . [as that]
interpretation would dramatically narrow the available protections available to
potential whistleblowers.”).
137
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984).
138
See, e.g., Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015);
Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1105–06; Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147–48;
Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013); Kramer, 2012 WL
4444820 at *5.
139
See Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1105; Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147–48;
Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *5.
140
See Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y.
2014); Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *5; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Egan,
2011 WL 1672066, at *5.
141
See, e.g., Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *5.
142
See, e.g., Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
136
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III. A PLAIN, UNAMBIGUOUS READING OF THE STATUTE IS THE
CORRECT READING AND IS THE POLICY THAT CONGRESS INTENDED
A.

Statutory Interpretation

It is the preeminent canon of statutory interpretation that
courts “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.”143 The first
step of statutory interpretation is to determine if the text is plain
and unambiguous.144 Judges have long recognized that if a
statute is plain and unambiguous, a court must apply the statute
according to its terms.145 Ambiguity is defined as “doubtfulness
or uncertainty of meaning or intention, as in a contractual term
or statutory provision.”146
In the context of statutory
interpretation, ambiguity is “the doubt which a judge must
entertain before she can search for and, if possible, apply a
secondary meaning.”147 In order to determine if a statute is
143
BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 US 176, 183 (2004) (alteration in
original) (quoting Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)).
144
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009) (citing United States v.
Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997)).
145
See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010)
(“We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its
terms.”); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 387 (“[W]e must apply [an unambiguous] statute
according to its terms.”); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (alteration
in original) (“[W]e are not free to rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted.
‘[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to
its terms.’ ” (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A.,
530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000))); Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is
well established that ‘when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the
courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to
enforce it according to its terms.’ ” (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 530 U.S.
at 6)); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (“[The Court’s] inquiry
must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent.’ ” (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 240 (1989)); Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945) (“The plain words
and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legiselative [sic] history which,
through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous
significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction.”); Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that . . . if [the meaning
of the statute] is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms.”); Thornley v. United States, 113 U.S. 310, 313 (1885) (“Where the
meaning of a statute is plain, it is the duty of the courts to enforce it according to its
obvious terms.”).
146
Ambiguity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
147
Id. (quoting RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 76–77 (1st ed.
1976)).
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ambiguous, a court looks to “the language itself, the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context
of the statute as a whole.”148 While even textualist readers admit
that a definition can be contradicted by other indications,149
“[w]hen . . . a definitional section says that a word ‘means’
something, the clear import is that this is its only meaning.”150 A
court may not refuse to enforce the plain reading of the statute
simply because it would create a hardship.151
Where a statute is clear, a court should not resort to
reviewing legislative history—this “only muddies the waters.”152
There are strong reasons why. First, legislative materials
generally contain the thoughts of only a handful of
representatives who actively discussed the bill at issue.153 “[I]t is
impossible to aggregate the individual expectations of 435 House
Members and match them up with an aggregation of as many as
100 Senators and with the President’s intent when he or she
signs the measure into law.”154 Second, using legislative history
affords judges the opportunity to supplant the plain meaning of a
statute with whatever external evidence they can locate favoring
their own ideological views.155 That is not to say that all judges
148

Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 228 (2012).
150
Id. at 226.
151
Helvering v. N.Y. Tr. Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934) (“The rule that, where the
statute contains no ambiguity, it must be taken literally and given effect accor[d]ing
to its language, is a sound one not to be put aside to avoid hardships that may
sometimes result from giving effect to the legislative purpose.”); Corona Coal Co. v.
United States, 263 U.S. 537, 540 (1924) (“[When] the words of the statute are plain,
with nothing in the context to make their meaning doubtful [and] no room is left for
construction . . . we are not at liberty to add an exception in order to remove
apparent hardship in particular cases.”); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157
U.S. 1, 33 (1895) (“It is not only the safer course to adhere to the words of a statute,
construed in their ordinary import, instead of entering into any inquiry as to the
supposed intention of congress, but it is the imperative duty of the court to do so.”);
see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 149, at 181 (“Not every harsh result indicates
a contradiction that must be ‘reconciled’ away.”).
152
United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997).
153
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE,
STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 605 (2014) [hereinafter LEGISLATION AND
ADMINISTRATION].
154
Id. (citing Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870–71
(1930)).
155
See id. at 603 (noting the concern that judges should not usurp plain
meaning by relying on legislative history to favor their own ideological views).
149
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are willfully manipulative. They may use legislative history to
unconsciously reinforce their own dispositions toward the
statute.156 Third, a heavy emphasis on legislative history creates
a perverse incentive for lobbyists and legislators “to stack the
legislative history.”157 It is much easier for interest groups “to
insert language into a committee report than to alter the
language of a statute.”158 These arguments do not suggest that
legislative history should never be used; rather, the use of
legislative history should be reserved for situations where
statutes are facially ambiguous.159
The surplusage canon is another canon of statutory
interpretation, which states, “if possible, every word and every
provision [of a statute] is to be given effect.”160 The surplusage
canon exemplifies the idea that it is not within a court’s function
to remove language from a statute.161 But the surplusage canon
is not always dispositive because “drafters do repeat themselves
and do include words that add nothing of substance, either out of
a flawed sense of style or to . . . [use the] belt-and-suspenders
approach.”162
Sometimes Congress intentionally adds
redundancies to ensure the needs of various supporters and
interest groups are satisfied.163
Statutory analysis often involves administrative law analysis
because Congress delegates rulemaking authority to executive
agencies.164 To determine if an agency interpretation of a statute
is entitled to deference, courts conduct a Chevron analysis.165

156

KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 181 (1999).
Id.
158
Id.
159
See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A
RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 74–77 (1989).
160
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 149, at 174.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 176–77.
163
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 153, at 468 (citing Abbe R.
Gluck & Linda Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 933–36 (2013)).
164
Here, Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to the SEC. See
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2012) (“The Commission shall have the authority to issue such
rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the
provisions of this section consistent with the purposes of this section.”).
165
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984).
157
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First, a court must determine whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.166 If Congress has
directly spoken to the question at issue, the court must effectuate
Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent.167 Fundamentally,
this stems from the separation of powers in the Constitution.168
The Constitution vests the power to create law with Congress,
not administrative agencies.169 Second, and only if the court
determines Congress has not answered the precise question at
issue, the court must determine whether the agency’s
interpretation of the statute is a reasonable one.170 If the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable, then that interpretation is
entitled to deference.171
1.

The Text of the Dodd−Frank Whistleblower Provisions Is
Unambiguous

The text of the Dodd−Frank Whistleblower Provisions is
unambiguous, thus, the plain, statutory definition of
whistleblower should be applied. Congress expressly provided
that
a
whistleblower
“means
any
individual
who
provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities
laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.”172 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and like-minded district courts
insist that, because subsection (iii) forbids employer retaliation
against whistleblowers for internal disclosures, it must follow
that the term whistleblower include persons who disclose
internally.173
However, the Fifth Circuit and like-minded district courts
correctly point out the major mistake that the Second Circuit and
like-minded courts have made: they ignore the fact that the
antiretaliation provision incorporates the statutory definition of
166

Id. at 842.
Id. at 842–43.
168
See Mich. v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
169
See id.
170
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
171
Id.
172
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). Recall that when Congress says a term
“means” something that is its only meaning. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 149,
at 226.
173
See, e.g., Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2015);
Ellington v.Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45–46 (D. Mass. 2013).
167
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whistleblower.174 As the Berman dissent points out, there is no
conflict or ambiguity; there is merely a statute that provides
protection that judges and the SEC find suboptimal.175 It is
improper for the courts to hide behind the veil of ambiguity to
avoid hardships that may sometimes result from giving effect to
the statutory protection as written.176 The courts should not
make rulings “based solely on a disagreement about public
policy.”177
The Second Circuit and like-minded district courts
incorrectly reasoned that a plain reading of the statute would
render subsection (iii) superfluous.178 However, even the Second
Circuit admitted that subsection (iii) would not be superfluous—
just “extremely limited [in] scope”179—in its response to the Fifth
Circuit’s reasoning that subsection (iii) is not superfluous
because it protects whistleblowers that report to the SEC and
internally simultaneously.180 As the Berman dissent points out,
it is unclear why this timing of reporting is relevant; an
individual might disclose to multiple people at the same time or
over a longer period.181 Nothing in the antiretaliation provision
prevents a person from reporting to the SEC to qualify as a
whistleblower and then, at some later date, reporting to an
internal compliance program.182 The only important timing
factor is if and when an employer learns that an employee has
reported to the SEC.183 Subsection (iii) is best understood as
protecting whistleblowers who have reported violations to the
SEC without their employer’s knowledge from retaliation, based
on an internal report of the same securities law violation. That
is, if subsection (iii) did not exist, then an employer would only be
174
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 626–27 (5th Cir. 2013);
Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013). In a clever sleight of
hand, the SEC also uses the terms “whistleblower” and “individual” interchangeably
in its arguments. See SEC 2d Cir. Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 13–15.
175
Berman, 801 F.3d at 158–59 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
176
Helvering v. New York Tr. Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934).
177
Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644 (E.D. Wis.
2014).
178
See, e.g., Berman, 801 F.3d at 151; Somers v. Digital Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1088, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
179
Berman, 801 F.3d at 151.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 157 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
182
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
183
See Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 648
(E.D. Tenn. 2015); supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text.
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prohibited from retaliating against an employee for a report to
the SEC or for obeying a judicial subpoena. This would give the
employer an opportunity to argue that it did not terminate the
employee for the report to the SEC because the employer did not
know about the report to the SEC. Indeed, the employer could
explain that it terminated the employee because of the internal
report, not the report to the SEC. Without subsection (iii) this
would be unsavory, but not prohibited.
Some district courts also cite the surplusage canon to
support their rulings that the statute is ambiguous; particularly,
that the plain reading of the statute renders “to the Commission”
in subsection (i) superfluous.184 As noted earlier, the surplusage
canon is not always dispositive; Congress sometimes creates
redundancies intentionally.185 It is perfectly reasonable to think
that Congress was redundantly clarifying the antiretaliation
provision, which has six sections between it and the definition
section.186 More problematic is that, in an effort to avoid finding
a small clause superfluous, these district courts have rendered
superfluous the entire statutory definition of whistleblower.187
According to the Second Circuit, the plain reading of the
statute also presents another problem with subsection (iii):
Under SOX, auditors and attorneys are required to report
internally before reporting to the SEC.188 The Second Circuit
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to exclude these
two groups from whistleblower protection.189
The statute does not, under any section, address whether
any groups are to be excluded from the definition of
whistleblower.190 In this statutory silence, SEC regulations have
created categorical exceptions, making certain groups ineligible
for whistleblower rewards.191 Several prominent independent

184
Somers v. Digital Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1102–03 (N.D. Cal.
2015); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
185
See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text.
186
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
187
Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 645 (E.D. Wis.
2014).
188
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2016).
189
Id. at 151–52, 155.
190
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
191
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(4) (2011) (excluding auditors, attorneys, and
internal compliance personnel by creating a rule that information obtained for an

FINAL_GILPIN

2016]

2/14/2017 11:03 PM

HIDING BEHIND THE VEIL OF AMBIGUITY

875

auditing firms voiced strong objections to proposed Rule 21F–4,192
which was unclear on whether auditors would be eligible for
whistleblower awards.193 In addition to individual firms, auditor
associations objected to the proposed rules, requesting that the
SEC categorically exclude auditors from whistleblower awards
because allowing auditors to receive such awards would
discourage the free flow of honest information to the auditor.194
One commenter noted that auditors have other reporting

audit, legal advice, or internal compliance does not qualify as “independent
knowledge”).
192
All of the “Big Four” accounting firms filed comments criticizing this
provision of proposed rule 21F–4. See, e.g., Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, to SEC (Dec. 22, 2010) (on
file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-281.pdf (“[W]e believe
that the whistleblower rules should not establish an alternative reporting channel
for any information derived by accounts from performance of a professional
engagement. [W]e agree with the exclusion of information reported by accountants
regarding violations by an engagement client or the client’s personnel.”); Comment
Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section
21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Ernst & Young LLP, to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Ernst & Young Comment Letter]
(on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-176.pdf (“[T]he
Proposing Release states, awards would be available ‘with respect to the
independent accountant’s performance of the engagement itself . . . . We do not
believe this aspect of the Rule Proposal is workable or necessary, and it is likely to
disrupt the traditional sort of trust and dialogue that must exist within an audit
engagement team to perform an effective audit.”); Comment Letter on Proposed
Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Deloitte LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y,
SEC (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3310/s73310-184.pdf (“Deloitte strongly supports implementation of an exclusion in the
Proposed Rules for individuals who obtained their information through the audit of a
company’s financial statements and for whom making a whistleblower submission
would be contrary to the requirements of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.”); Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from KPMG LLP, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with SEC),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-152.pdf (stating that the proposed
eligibility exclusion is “too narrow” and would encourage accountants to violate
professional standards).
193
See Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70493 (proposed Nov. 17, 2010)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)).
194
See, e.g., Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the
Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from
Cynthia M. Fornelli, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Audit Quality, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 23, 2010) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3310/s73310-242.pdf.
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requirements and protections available to them.195
After
reviewing comments, the SEC’s final rule excluded auditors by
determining that knowledge gained by an internal audit did not
qualify as “independent knowledge.”196 Therefore, the Second
Circuit’s concern about auditors being unprotected is unfounded
because, under SEC regulations, auditors are already excluded
from whistleblower awards.
The SEC, in its proposed rules, recognized that attorneys
should also be categorically excluded from whistleblower
awards.197 When a commenter suggested that lawyers should be
eligible for awards based on nonprivileged information, the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) replied with serious
concerns.198 The ABA was concerned that whistleblower awards:
[M]ay create a strong incentive for a lawyer to compromise his
or her ethical obligations and undermine the client confidence
that the U.S. Supreme Court [has] recognized . . . as critical in
assuring the continued effectiveness of the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine. A client’s awareness
that its attorneys may use information provided confidentially
to obtain large whistleblower awards could well prevent the free
flow of information necessary to the client’s right to effective
counsel.199

In light of these strong objections, the SEC’s final rule excluded
attorneys from obtaining whistleblower awards from any
knowledge gained by the attorney-client relationship, including
195
See Ernst & Young Comment Letter, supra note 192 (“[U]nlike the typical
corporate employee, for whom Congress clearly thought a bounty could encourage
reporting of wrongdoing, accountants are already subject to reporting requirements
by virtue of their professional status.”).
196
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 FR 34300,
34317–18 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(4)). Under
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012), a person must give “original information” to qualify for a
whistleblower award. § 78u-6 (a)(3)(A) (“The term ‘original information’ means
information that . . . is derived from the independent knowledge . . . of a
whistleblower.”). Because “original information” is a vague term, the SEC has
promulgated rules to clarify.
197
See Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70492. (proposed Nov. 17,
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)).
198
See generally Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the
Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from
Stephen N. Zack, President, American Bar Association, to Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairwoman, SEC (May 20, 2011) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/
s7-33-10/s73310-315.pdf.
199
Id. at 3.
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from nonprivileged information.200 Thus, the Second Circuit’s
concern about attorneys being unprotected is also unfounded
because attorneys are already excluded from whistleblower
awards under SEC regulations.
2.

Reading Subsection (iii) as a Judicially-Implied Exception Is
Improper

Courts may not create exceptions to a statute if a plain
provision of the statute does not contain one.201 Moreover, when
a statute contains exceptions, courts do not have authority to
create others,202 even if the absence of an exception within the
statute may produce harsh results.203
The SEC’s structuralist choices regarding categorical
exceptions204 support the result that the antiretaliation provision
is not an appropriate location for an exception to a statutory
definition located in a different section of the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions. Because the SEC chose to exclude
certain categories of individuals by creating regulations
concerning the definition of “independent knowledge,”205 the SEC
impliedly admitted that the definition section, and not the
antiretaliation provision, is the appropriate section to find
exceptions to the whistleblower definition.
Even if the antiretaliation provision was an appropriate
location for an exception to the whistleblower definition, the text
of the antiretaliation provision is not styled as an exception.
Subsection (iii) is not grammatically or structurally different
from subsections (i) and (ii).206 As one court noted, all subsection
(iii) does is provide disclosure protections for individuals in
addition to the protection triggered by the first disclosure to the
Commission.207

200
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300,
34314–15 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)).
201
Lessee of French v. Spencer, 62 U.S. 228, 238 (1858).
202
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000).
203
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
204
See supra notes 188–197 and accompanying text.
205
See supra notes 188–197 and accompanying text.
206
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
207
See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 645 (E.D. Wis.
2014).
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Legislative History Indicates That Congress Wanted
Whistleblowers To Disclose to the SEC

Courts rely on the fact that Congress added subsection (iii)
at the eleventh hour to support the conclusion that Congress
could not have intended subsection (iii) to be such a narrow
exception.208 But such courts ignore the specific statements of
the House and Senate reports, both of which indicate that
Congress’s primary goal was to persuade potential
whistleblowers to disclose to the SEC.209 This is far more
concrete evidence than inferential “ ‘doubt[s]’ about what was
going on in the heads of individual ‘conferees’ during the
legislative process.”210
B.

Implications

This plain reading of the statute has practical implications
for real world behavior.
This Section addresses those
implications
for
three
distinct
groups:
(1) potential
whistleblowers; (2) employers; and (3) the SEC.
First, due to the split of authority between the Second and
Fifth Circuits, potential whistleblowers will likely begin
reporting directly to the SEC in order to qualify for
antiretaliation protection.
This presents two likely future
scenarios: (1) potential whistleblowers will report internally and
to the SEC simultaneously, or (2) potential whistleblowers will
report directly to the SEC and not report internally at all. While
this appears to give incomplete protection to whistleblowers who
only report internally, recall that one of the purposes of the
Dodd-Frank Act was “[t]o promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system . . . .”211 Whistleblowers are a means to
achieving financial stability because whistleblowers report

208

See, e.g., Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015).
Both the House and Senate reports indicate that Congress’s intent was to
increase the flow of information to the SEC. See supra notes 48–49 and
accompanying text.
210
Berman, 801 F.3d at 160 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing to majority language
at 155).
211
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12,
and 15 U.S.C.).
209
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hidden securities fraud based on firsthand knowledge of facts
that would not ordinarily be available to regulators.212 This
reading does not leave potential whistleblowers without recourse;
they still have a cause of action under SOX, which protects
internal disclosures.213
Second, employers may be alarmed that their internal
compliance policies are futile. However, there is still a strong
incentive to report internally because Dodd-Frank whistleblower
awards are higher if the whistleblower reports internally.214
Also, after research, the SEC concluded that most whistleblowers
who report internally are motivated by nonmonetary reasons,
usually a sense of loyalty to the employer or of social welfare,215
which means that those who already report internally will
continue to do so. If employers are still concerned about
preserving the status quo of their compliance systems, they
should petition the SEC to have the SEC revise its rules to
require simultaneous reporting, which would be consistent with
Congress’s explicit requirement that an individual report to the
SEC to qualify as a whistleblower.216
The SEC may have three concerns with this reading: (1) that
the agency might be overwhelmed with frivolous complaints;
(2) that the statute will not sufficiently protect potential

212
See Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing
Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483,
519 (2012).
213
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012); see also discussion supra Section I.A.
214
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–6(a)(4) (2011).
215
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300,
34360, n.453 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)).
216
During the comment period on the proposed rules, many companies and
organizations suggested using internal compliance programs simultaneously with
SEC reporting or before reporting to the SEC to handle the alleged violation
internally. See e.g., Hearing on Legis. Proposals To Address the Negative
Consequences of the Dodd Frank Whistleblower Provisions Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Ken
Daly, President and CEO, NACD), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310312.pdf.; Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Robert A.
Long, Covington & Burling LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (February 18,
2011) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-283.pdf;
Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions
of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Neila B. Radin, Chair,
Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, to Elizabeth M. Murphey, SEC (Dec.
17, 2010) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-230.pdf;
Ass’n of Bank Dirs. Comment Letter, supra note 58.
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whistleblowers that report to internal compliance programs; and
(3) that the statute will not sufficiently protect potential
whistleblowers who report to federal law enforcement agencies or
self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”).
The first issue has
already been resolved by the SEC Rule 21F-2(a)(2) which
requires that there be a possible violation,217 coupled with a
requirement that a potential whistleblower make the disclosures
subject to the penalty of perjury.218
By enforcing these
requirements, the SEC can ensure that it continues to receive
non-frivolous complaints.
For example, in 2014, the SEC
permanently disqualified an individual from any future award
because the individual filed 196 separate administrative actions
using false information and baseless claims.219
To address the second issue, the SEC should amend its rules
to require simultaneous internal disclosure and disclosure to the
SEC.220 Several organizations suggested this approach during
the comment period,221 but the SEC rejected it.222 The SEC
should reconsider this proposal as a means of protecting potential
whistleblowers that report to internal compliance programs.
Last, despite its rhetoric, discouraging reports to federal law
enforcement agencies223 is a nonissue for potential Dodd-Frank
whistleblowers. The SEC has offered no evidence supporting its
assertion that this is a significant issue. In its amicus briefs, the
SEC asserts that this is an issue, and uses the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (the “FBI”) as an example, but offers no
information on how often whistleblowers report to law

217

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2011).
See id. § 240.21F-9.
219
2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 14–15.
220
The author suggests this course of action because it is unlikely that the ideal
result—congressional clarification—will take place because of current congressional
gridlock and inactivity. See Drew Desilver, In Late Spurt of Activity, Congress Avoids
‘Least Productive’ Title, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2014/12/29/in-late-spurt-of-activity-congress-avoids-leastproductive-title.
221
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
222
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300,
34361 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)).
223
The SEC concedes that reports to state attorneys general would never qualify
as “to the Commission” under subsection (iii). SEC 2d Cir. Amicus Brief, supra note
64, at n.27; Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 15 n.28, Verble
v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, No. 15-06397, 2016 WL 492224 (6th Cir. Feb.
4, 2016) [hereinafter SEC 6th Cir. Amicus Brief].
218

FINAL_GILPIN

2016]

2/14/2017 11:03 PM

HIDING BEHIND THE VEIL OF AMBIGUITY

881

enforcement agencies rather than reporting to the SEC.224 In its
2015 report to Congress, the Office of the Whistleblower provided
detailed information about how many tips are given to the SEC,
where those tips originate from geographically, and what types of
allegations are made.225 Noticeably, however, the report had no
information on how many tips were referred to the SEC by
federal law enforcement agencies.226 In its Securities Fraud
Awareness & Prevention Tips sheet, the FBI advises investors to
file a complaint with the SEC.227 In fact, the FBI does not even
list itself on its own list of who to contact and, instead, merely
states that a whistleblower could file a complaint with “a law
enforcement agency.”228 Therefore, the SEC’s concern about
discouraging reports to federal law enforcement agencies is
unfounded.
For similar reasons, discouraging reports to self-regulatory
organizations (“SROs”) is an unfounded issue for potential DoddFrank whistleblowers. Again, the Office of the Whistleblower
provided no information in its 2015 report on how many referrals
it receives from SROs.229 Other sources provide only imprecise
figures.
For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”) referred approximately 700 cases to the
SEC for investigation, but it did not provide a detailed
breakdown based on types of claim.230 FINRA did provide some
examples of claims that were referred to the SEC; however,

224
See SEC 2d Cir Amicus Brief, supra note 64; SEC 6th Cir. Amicus Brief,
supra note 223.
225
SEC, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 21–24, 28–30, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/reports
pubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-report-2015.pdf
[hereinafter
2015
ANNUAL
REPORT].
226
See generally id.
227
Securities Fraud Awareness & Prevention Tips, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/securities-fraud (last
visited Nov. 7, 2016).
228
See id.
229
See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 225.
230
Office of Fraud Detection and Market Intelligence, FIN. INDUSTRY REG.
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/industry/ofdmi [hereinafter OFDMI] (last visited
Nov. 7, 2016). This Note only discusses reports made to FINRA because both the
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ direct complaints and inquiries to FINRA.
See Complaints and Inquiries, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, https://www.nyse.com/
regulation/complaints-and-inquiries (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); Contact NASDAQ,
NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/help/contact-information.aspx (last visited Nov. 7,
2016).
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“Office of the Whistleblower” is last on the list provided.231
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that whistleblowers—
insiders of a company and experienced professionals in the
securities industry—are aware that possible securities law
violations should be reported directly to the SEC, which is “the
primary overseer and regulator of the U.S. securities markets.”232
Therefore, any implications of this plain, unambiguous reading of
the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions are without merit or
insignificant.
CONCLUSION
A plain, unambiguous reading of the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower provision is correct, and courts should give effect
to Congress’s intent. In light of the growing uncertainty as a
result of the split of authority among circuit courts, concerned
employers should petition the SEC to amend its regulations, and
the SEC should amend its regulations. Unless Congress or the
Supreme Court weigh in—which is unlikely233—the burden
remains with the SEC to amend its unsound regulations to
protect only those individuals who report to the SEC or to require
simultaneous disclosure. In this way, everyone reports to the
SEC, and everyone is protected.

231

See OFDMI, supra note 230.
What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited
Nov. 7, 2016).
233
See Desilver, supra note 220.
232

